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Abstract—Over the recent years, the availability of datasets
containing personal, but anonymized information has been
continuously increasing. Extensive research has revealed that
such datasets are vulnerable to privacy breaches: being able
to reveal sensitive information about individuals through de-
anonymization methods. Here, we provide a taxonomy of the
research in de-anonymization.
Index Terms—de-anonymization, privacy, re-identification
I. INTRODUCTION
De-anonymization is not as hard a task as one might
think. A common misconception is that removing all explicit
identifiers such as name, address and phone number from
a dataset, makes the data anonymous. Several approaches
described in the de-anonymization literature have proven
this belief wrong. The continuously increasing availability
of datasets, either private or public, that can be used as
auxiliary data in de-anonymization techniques and the fact
that there is a privacy breach when even a single individual
is identified from a dataset, make anonymization of data a
difficult challenge to address, while making de-anonymization
easier.
This short paper provides an abstract view of data de-
anonymization and raises the awareness of data providers on
this topic. Our survey differs from the three other existing
surveys on de-anonymization [1]–[4] in providing a more ab-
stract view on this topic and being targeted at data providers.
In the next section, we present our view on the de-
anonymization along with references to scientific publica-
tions. Note that due to the space limitation, we only cite the
most important and representative publications of their kind.
Finally, we provide a short discussion and implications for
data providers on the de-anonymization process.
II. DE-ANONYMIZATION PROCESS
We identify three elements in the de-anonymization pro-
cess: purpose, data (target and auxiliary), and approach.
A. Purpose
Purpose refers to why one would perform a de-
anonymization attack on a dataset. We identify the three
following purposes:
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1) Proof of Concept: An attack of such purpose aims in
revealing whether a dataset is de-anonymizable or that it
cannot be de-anonymized with reasonable effort. This is an
important action for data providers to take before releasing
their dataset(s), keeping in mind that the re-identification of
just one individual is considered a privacy breach and is
subject to legal action and fines imposed by governments.
2) Research: De-anonymization attacks having such pur-
pose intend to explore the weaknesses of published datasets
and anonymization methods, advance the field of data privacy
and encourage others to do so. All publications cited in this
work have such a purpose and most of them do not report
a de-anonymization attack has been performed, but merely
prove the de-anonimizability of the dataset(s) they study and
report the extent to which it is de-anonymizable. Those who
report a de-anonymization attack has been performed, do not
reveal the identities of the individuals they managed to re-
identify and their findings are not confirmed by the dataset
owners.
3) Malicious: An attacker with malicious intents would
perform a de-anonymization attack in order to publicly re-
veal private, sensitive information of individuals who would,
otherwise, not want to have this information published.
B. Target and Auxiliary Data
The target dataset is defined as the anonymized dataset,
potentially containing sensitive information of users that an
attacker tries to de-anonymize. The target dataset’s availability
might be public or private, with the public ones being the
most used in research. Some examples from the literature are:
health records [5], movie ratings [6] and telecommunication
mobility trace data [7].
The auxiliary data/information is defined as the non-
anonymized information that aids the attacker in the de-
anonymization of the target dataset. The auxiliary infor-
mation’s availability might be public or private, with the
public ones being the most used in research. Some examples
from the literature are: voter registration list [5], IMDB’s
user reviews [6] and social networks [8]. We categorize the
auxiliary information into internal and external.
Internal refers to the auxiliary information that comes from
the same source as the target dataset. This is the case of
many research publications where the studied dataset is split
into training and test set, corresponding to internal auxiliary
information and target dataset, respectively. Another case
is when an attacker obtains part of the target dataset non-
anonymized.
External refers to the auxiliary information that does not
come from the same source as the target data, and usually
does not have the same structure as the target dataset.
C. Approach
The intuition behind all approaches in data de-
anonymization is that all users have uniquely defining
characteristics. There exist varying approaches exploiting
this uniqueness, whose complexity depends on the complexity
of the data they apply to. Therefore, in the following we will
group the approaches by the type of data they apply to.
Low dimensional data require the least complex approaches
to de-anonymize. Sweeney [5] demonstrates that the com-
bination of {ZIP code, gender, date of birth} is enough
to uniquely identify 87% of the U.S. population using the
Generalized Dirichlet drawer principle (also known as the
Pigeonhole principle). Frankowski et. al [9], in one of their
experiments, showed that even a simple set intersection is
enough to identify a part of the users in a movie ratings
dataset just by the movie mentions they made in another
dataset.
High dimensional data refers to transaction-like data which
contain multiple interactions per user, such as ratings and
web browsing history. In order to de-anonymize such data,
a model of the user must be built and the de-anonymization
method usually depends on similarity between the users in
the target dataset and the auxiliary information. The intuition
behind such methods is that each user’s behavior is unique.
Narayanan and Shmatikov [6] successfully matched up to
99% of the users in the Netflix Prize dataset (movie ratings)
to their publicly available IMDB profiles, by applying a scor-
ing function. This de-anonymization could reveal political,
religious and societal views of the users that they do not
publicly express, but are inferred through their private ratings
of movies. Frankowski et. al [9] applied a similar approach for
movie ratings and Su et. al [10] for web browsing histories.
Graph data are any kind of data that can be modelled
with nodes connected with each other through edges. The
most notable cases are the social networks where users
correspond to nodes and edges to the relationships between
them (uni- or bi-directional). The intuition here is that each
user has a distinctive social network and, therefore, social
graph. Several approaches have been introduced exploiting
the unique structure of the graphs, by trying to match the
anonymized graphs to the non-anonymized ones [11].
Some data can be categorized to either high dimensional or
graph data depending on the way they are interpreted. Trace
data are such an example: Gambs et. al [12] interpret mobility
traces as a set of states and transitions and they define several
metrics calculating the similarity between the anonymized and
non-anonymized traces, while Srivatsa and Hicks [8] interpret
mobility traces as a graph consisting of meetings between
users and match it to a non-anonymized social network graph.
III. DISCUSSION
The intuitions of the de-anonymization approaches in the
literature rely on the uniqueness of the users’ characteristics
and if an attack is to be performed on a large scale, a model
needs to be built, which is, mostly, more complex than the
Generalized Dirichlet drawer principle used by Sweeney to
show that 87% of the U.S. population is uniquely identifiable
by the combination of {ZIP code, gender, date of birth} [5].
However, an average person with data processing skills would
be interested in attacking very specific individuals and his/her
attack would not require a complex model to be built and a
naive approach might suffice.
Consider this example: An attacker obtains access to an
anonymized mobile phone trace dataset which contains the
antenna a mobile phone is connected to at certain time
intervals. Would it be hard for the attacker to re-identify
his/her neighbor in the dataset, if the attacker knows where the
neighbor works or where he/she’s been during the weekend?
Simple SQL queries to the dataset containing the location
of an antenna and time of connection would most probably
suffice. As de Montjoye et. al [7] claim: ”four spatio-temporal
points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals”
in such a dataset.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a taxonomy of the research
in de-anonymization from an abstract point of view, ori-
ented towards data providers. Specifically, we identified
three elements in the de-anonymization process, referenced
prior research on de-anonymization and point out that de-
anonymization is not as hard as one might think, if one is
given strong auxiliary information.
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